Inefficient Standard Adoption: Inertia and Momentum Revisited

12 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2006

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This article examines the possibility that consumers will adopt an inefficient standard. When there are successive generations of consumers, the current generation will not consider the costs and benefits to past and future generations of adopting a new standard. If a standard is proprietary, the incentives of a firm to induce adoption of the standard generally do not match the social incentives. The divergence is caused by the firm`s imperfect ability to appropriate the future surplus generated by the standard. (JEL D62, L1)

Suggested Citation

Clements, Matthew T., Inefficient Standard Adoption: Inertia and Momentum Revisited. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 507-518, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906248

Matthew T. Clements (Contact Author)

St. Edward's University ( email )

3001 South Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78704
United States
(512) 428-1321 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
428
PlumX Metrics