Academic Tenure, Posttenure Effort, and Contractual Damages

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Antony Dnes

Antony Dnes

Hull University Business School (HUBS)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Abstract

In this article we explore the incentive properties of academic tenure relative to alternatives that might be substitutes for tenure, in particular contractual damages. We emphasize the role of tenure in providing an incentive for incumbent faculty to reveal the characteristics of recruits and to maintain their own performance posttenure. Our results suggest that tenure is just one of many mechanisms potentially able to achieve honest revelation. (JEL I2, K0, L2)

Suggested Citation

Dnes, Antony and Garoupa, Nuno, Academic Tenure, Posttenure Effort, and Contractual Damages. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 43, Issue 4, pp. 831-839, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906357

Antony Dnes (Contact Author)

Hull University Business School (HUBS) ( email )

Hull, HU6 7RX
United Kingdom
44-1482-465875 (Phone)
44-1482-466216 (Fax)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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