Social Dynamics and the Enforcement of Minority Protection Norms

39 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2006

See all articles by Emanuela Carbonara

Emanuela Carbonara

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Piero Pasotti

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

Minority-protection laws often present variations in the level of protection over time. We show how these changes may be the result of the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters' support. The enforcement of minority protection laws is strong when social protest is high. Interestingly, when non protesters are able to reap higher benefits from protest than protesters themselves, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when discrimination is back to high levels.

Keywords: Minority protection, Harassment, Affirmative Action, Law enforcement, Evolutionary dynamics, Legal evolution

JEL Classification: K10, K42, D70, B52, Z13

Suggested Citation

Carbonara, Emanuela and Pasotti, Piero, Social Dynamics and the Enforcement of Minority Protection Norms (June 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906635 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906635

Emanuela Carbonara (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy
+39 051 2098149 (Phone)
+39 051 2098040 (Fax)

Piero Pasotti

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli, 2
Bologna, Bo 40126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/pieropasottiswebpage/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
104
Abstract Views
799
rank
268,065
PlumX Metrics