Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence

GATE Working Paper No. W.P.05-12

38 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2006 Last revised: 10 May 2010

See all articles by Nabanita Datta Gupta

Nabanita Datta Gupta

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Anders Poulsen

University of East Anglia

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1, 2005

Abstract

Male and female choices differ in many economic situations, e.g., on the labor market. This paper considers whether such differences are driven by different attitudes towards competition. In our experiment subjects choose between a tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real task. Men choose the tournament significantly more often than women. Women are mainly influenced by their degree of risk aversion, but men are not. Men compete more against men than against women, but compete against women who are thought to compete. The behavior of men seems primarily to be influenced by social norms whose nature and origin we discuss.

Keywords: competition, experiment, gender, piece rater, relative ability, risk aversion, tournament

JEL Classification: C70, C91, J16, J24, J31, M52

Suggested Citation

Datta Gupta, Nabanita and Poulsen, Anders and Villeval, Marie Claire, Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence (November 1, 2005). GATE Working Paper No. W.P.05-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906766

Nabanita Datta Gupta (Contact Author)

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
8210 Aarhus V
Denmark
+45 87165207 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pure.au.dk/portal/da/ndg@econ.au.dk

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Anders Poulsen

University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich NR47TJ, Norfolk
United Kingdom
+44 0 1603 591066 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uea.ac.uk/eco/ecopeople/PoulsenA.html

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/villeval/villeval.html

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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