Are Economic Agents Successful Optimizers? An Analysis Through Service Strategy in Tennis

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-048/2

34 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2006

See all articles by Franc Klaassen

Franc Klaassen

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); Tinbergen Institute

J.R. Magnus

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

Date Written: May 19, 2006

Abstract

We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. We show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy, and we provide a lower bound of the inefficiency. The inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average at least 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women, leading to a possible increase of income for the efficient player of 18.7% for men and 32.8% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question whether economic agents are successful optimizers.

Keywords: Inefficiency, Frontier, Optimal strategy, Tennis

JEL Classification: C14, C15, D01, D21

Suggested Citation

Klaassen, Franc and Magnus, Jan R., Are Economic Agents Successful Optimizers? An Analysis Through Service Strategy in Tennis (May 19, 2006). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-048/2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907001

Franc Klaassen

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4191 (Phone)
+31 20 525 4254 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Jan R. Magnus (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

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