Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy

42 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2006

See all articles by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Mandar P. OAK

Williams College - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be deologically 'disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.

Keywords: Coalitions, Ideology, Rents

JEL Classification: C72, D72, H19

Suggested Citation

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha and Oak, Mandar P., Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy (June 2006). FEEM Working Paper No. 83.2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907289

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Mandar P. Oak

Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

Fernald House
Williamstown, MA 01267
United States
413-597-2300 (Phone)
413-597-4045 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.williams.edu/Economics/oak/cv.htm

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