Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision-Making

64 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2006

See all articles by David M. Byrne

David M. Byrne

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Michelle Sovinsky Goeree

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Bridget Hiedemann

Seattle University

Steven N. Stern

Stony Brooke University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 10, 2006

Abstract

We use the 1993 wave of the AHEAD data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines his or her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of child characteristics into wage effects, quality of care effects, and burden effects.

We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest.

Keywords: Long-term Care, Home Health Care, Informal Care, Empirical

Suggested Citation

Byrne, David M. and Goeree, Michelle Sovinsky and Hiedemann, Bridget and Stern, Steven N., Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and Family Decision-Making (May 10, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907349

David M. Byrne

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th and C Streets, NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Michelle Sovinsky Goeree (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~goeree/

Bridget Hiedemann

Seattle University ( email )

900 Broadway
Seattle, WA 98122
United States

Steven N. Stern

Stony Brooke University

Melville Library N4004
Stony Brook, NY 11794-3384
United States

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