Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients Have Any Power?

29 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2006 Last revised: 24 Jun 2011

See all articles by Joshua S. Gans

Joshua S. Gans

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Andrew Leigh

Australian National University - Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 24, 2011

Abstract

We provide a new method of identifying the level of relative bargaining power in bilateral negotiations using exogenous variation in the degree of conflict between parties. Using daily births data, we study negotiations over birth timing. In doing so, we exploit the fact that fewer children are born on the “inauspicious” dates of February 29 and April 1; most likely, we argue, reflecting parental preferences. When these inauspicious dates abut a weekend, this creates a potential conflict between avoiding the inauspicious date (the parents’ likely preference), and avoiding the weekend (the doctor’s likely preference). Using daily births data, we estimate how often this conflict is resolved in favor of the physician. We show how this provides an estimate of how bargaining power is distributed between patients and physicians.

Keywords: timing of births, weekend effect, inauspicious days, bargaining power

JEL Classification: I11, J13

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S. and Leigh, Andrew, Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients Have Any Power? (June 24, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907406

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Andrew Leigh

Australian National University - Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences ( email )

HC Coombs Building
Australian National University
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia
+61261251374 (Phone)
+61261250182 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/~aleigh/

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