Tax Evasion and Social Interactions
GATE Working Paper No. 04-10
30 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2006 Last revised: 10 May 2010
Date Written: September 1, 2004
The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects.
Keywords: laboratory experiments, simultaneous Tobit, social interactions, tax evasion
JEL Classification: C24, C92, D63, H26, Z13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation