Competition, Monopoly and Aftermarkets

43 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2006  

Michael Waldman

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Dennis W. Carlton

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

Consider a durable goods producer that potentially has market power in the aftermarkets associated with its own products. An important question is to what extent, if any, should the antitrust laws restrict the firm's behavior in these aftermarkets? In this paper we explore three models that illustrate how various behaviors that hurt competition in aftermarkets can, in fact, be efficient responses to potential inefficiencies that can arise in aftermarkets. Our results should give courts pause before intervening in aftermarkets.

Suggested Citation

Waldman, Michael and Carlton , Dennis W., Competition, Monopoly and Aftermarkets (March 2006). Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 10-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907517 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907517

Michael Waldman (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8631 (Phone)

Dennis W. Carlton

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-322-0215 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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