Is There a Tradeoff between Average Patent Pendency and Examination Errors?

21 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2006

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Peter Nijkamp

VU University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

It is now common knowledge that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) takes too long to process patent applications and that examiners make too many errors in the patent approval process. Given these twin concerns, we study the following question in this paper. Should the director of an organization such as the USPTO have a small number of examiners examine incoming patent applications less stringently or should this director have a large number of examiners examine the same patent applications more stringently? We employ a simple queuing model and show that if decreasing the average patent pendency is crucial then it makes more sense for the director to select the less stringent patent examination regime. In contrast, if reducing the number of examination errors in the patent approval process is more important then the director ought to choose the more stringent patent examination regime.

Keywords: Average Patent Pendency, Examination Errors, Queuing Theory, Tradeoff, Uncertainty

JEL Classification: O32, O34, D81

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Nijkamp, Peter, Is There a Tradeoff between Average Patent Pendency and Examination Errors? (June 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=908579 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.908579

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Peter Nijkamp

VU University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 4446091 (Phone)
+31 20 4445611 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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