The Role of Principal-Agent Conflicts in the 1980s Thrift Crisis

38 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 1996 Last revised: 18 Nov 2008

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 4, 1995

Abstract

Agency theory suggests that many of the costs incurred by the taxpayer during the 1980s thrift crisis were the result of conflicts between principals and their agents. This study models the costs associated with three distinct types of agency conflicts involved in closing an insolvent thrift conflicts between creditors and owners, between owners and managers, and between taxpayers and government officials. Using a model that controls for sample-selection bias, the study presents strong evidence that thrift owners effected wealth transfers from creditors by undertaking high-risk investments, and that government officials pursued policies that increased losses to the thrift deposit insurance fund which ultimately were funded by the taxpayer. The results do not show that managers effected wealth transfers from owners through expense-preference behavior, but rather that inefficient management increased the losses of the deposit insurance fund.

Keywords: agency, agency cost, failure, moral hazard, principal-agent, saving & loan, S&L, thrift

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32, G33, R30

Suggested Citation

Cole, Rebel A. and Eisenbeis, Robert Eisenbeis, The Role of Principal-Agent Conflicts in the 1980s Thrift Crisis (April 4, 1995). Real Estate Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 195-218, 1996. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=9092

Rebel A. Cole (Contact Author)

Florida Atlantic University ( email )

College of Business
777 Glades Road
Boca Raton, FL 33431
United States
1-561-297-4969 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://rebelcole.com

Robert Eisenbeis Eisenbeis

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
1,171
PlumX Metrics