Voluntary Disclosures and Information Production By Analysts
42 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2006
Date Written: September 28, 2007
Abstract
We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures. Moreover, a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures.
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, Conservatism, Accounting precision, Financial analysts
JEL Classification: G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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