Special Interests and the Gains from Political Integration

28 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2006

See all articles by Daniel Brou

Daniel Brou

University of Western Ontario

Michele Ruta

Economic Research Division, WTO; Columbia Business School - Economics Department; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Abstract

This paper presents a formal study of economic influence by special-interest groups under political integration and separation. We first show that countries where more groups are organized to lobby gain from political integration on economic grounds. The reason is that a more organized country, under a political union, can affect policies in the other country to its advantage, something that a less organized country can do to a lesser extent. We then study the interaction of political integration and endogenous lobbying structure. We show that political integration affects the formation of interest groups. Moreover, if a country is more organized before political integration, this will continue to be the case afterward.

Suggested Citation

Brou, Daniel and Ruta, Michele, Special Interests and the Gains from Political Integration. Economics & Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 191-218, July 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=909635 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00168.x

Daniel Brou

University of Western Ontario ( email )

London, Ontario N6A 5B8
Canada
519-661-2111 x84815 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://publish.uwo.ca/~dbrou/

Michele Ruta (Contact Author)

Economic Research Division, WTO ( email )

Rue de Lausanne 154
CH-1211 Geneva
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.iue.it/Personal/Fellows/MicheleRuta/Welcome.htm

Columbia Business School - Economics Department ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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