Rationality, Strategic Uncertainty and Belief Diversity in Non-Cooperative Games

17 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2006 Last revised: 11 Sep 2015

See all articles by Eduardo Zambrano

Eduardo Zambrano

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo - Economics

Date Written: September 10, 2015

Abstract

I investigate the existence of epistemic models for complete information games that satisfy the following properties: (R) players do not rule out their opponents use rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices, (K) they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action profile that is ultimately played and (SU) they do not rule out strategic uncertainty. In this paper I show that for a large class of games there are no epistemic models that satisfy properties (R), (K) and (SU).

Keywords: Interactive epistemology, belief diversity in games

JEL Classification: C72, D83

Suggested Citation

Zambrano, Eduardo, Rationality, Strategic Uncertainty and Belief Diversity in Non-Cooperative Games (September 10, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=910552 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.910552

Eduardo Zambrano (Contact Author)

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo - Economics ( email )

Orfalea College of Business
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
United States
805-756-5327 (Phone)
805-756-1473 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://calpoly.edu/~ezambran

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