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Patterns of Multi-Agent Land Conservation: Crowding In/Out, Agglomeration, and Policy

40 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2006  

H. J. Albers

Oregon State University - Applied Economics/FES

Amy W. Ando

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics

Michael B. Batz

Resources for the Future

Date Written: June 21, 2006

Abstract

This paper explores the spatial equilibrium patterns of land conservation that derive from a game between land conservation agents who provide public goods. The shape of the conservation benefit function determines whether one agent's conservation crowds in/out conservation by the other agent. Value for contiguity of conservation can produce: "spatial attraction," more conservation, and spatially-strategic behavior. The level of social benefits attained in the game depends on budget constraints, game structure, and the similarity between agents' objectives. The paper uses this spatially-explicit game structure to analyze special cases including hot-spots, high-cost parcels, agglomeration bonuses, and localized land trusts.

Keywords: conservation, spatial, land use, game, crowding out

JEL Classification: Q24, Q28, R14

Suggested Citation

Albers, H. J. and Ando, Amy W. and Batz, Michael B., Patterns of Multi-Agent Land Conservation: Crowding In/Out, Agglomeration, and Policy (June 21, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=910983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.910983

Heidi J. Albers (Contact Author)

Oregon State University - Applied Economics/FES ( email )

RIchardson 336
Corvallis, OR 97331
United States

Amy W. Ando

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics ( email )

326 Mumford Hall, MC-710
Urbana, IL 61801
United States
217-333-5130 (Phone)
217-333-5538 (Fax)

Michael B. Batz

Resources for the Future ( email )

1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-328-5020 (Phone)
202-328-5137 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rff.org

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