The Elimination of Madagascar's Vanilla Marketing Board, Ten Years on

50 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2006

See all articles by Olivier Cadot

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Jaime de Melo

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Laure Dutoit

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

Commodity prices are usually very slow to recover from adverse shocks. This is one of the reasons why it has proven so difficult either to smooth their effect or to stabilize them, and why it is sometimes argued that they should behave as if shocks were permanent. There is no reason however why countries should not find ways to protect themselves. This paper develops one practical idea on how this could be done. Our goal is not to stabilize prices, but to smooth the income of the producers. Countries, we assume, should get protection against deviation of commodity prices from a moving average of past prices. This avoids the pitfalls of past stabilization that attempted to stabilize around a single price and yet our scheme gives countries time to adjust to permanent shocks. Over a period of a 50 years time horizon, we simulate that the median cost would be worth about six months of exports.

Keywords: Marketing board, poverty, vanilla, Madagascar

JEL Classification: F14, O11, O12

Suggested Citation

Cadot, Olivier and de Melo, Jaime and Dutoit, Laure, The Elimination of Madagascar's Vanilla Marketing Board, Ten Years on (March 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5548, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=912228

Olivier Cadot (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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World Bank ( email )

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Jaime De Melo

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )

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Switzerland
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+41 22 705 8293 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/demelo/Jaime.html

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Laure Dutoit

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

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