Does Migration Empower Married Women?

45 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2006

See all articles by Natalie Chen

Natalie Chen

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

Differences in gender-based labour market discrimination across countries imply that migration may affect husbands and wives differently. If migrant wives experience a relative improvement in their labour market position, bargaining theory suggests that they should experience comparatively larger gains. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labour market allows more flexibility in their labour supply choices. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for migrant women lead them to bear the double burden of market and household work.

Keywords: International migration, gender discrimination, renegotiation

JEL Classification: D1, F2

Suggested Citation

Chen, Natalie and Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo, Does Migration Empower Married Women? (March 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5559. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=912259

Natalie Chen (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
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Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

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Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

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