Mixed Bundling Auctions

29 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2006

See all articles by Philippe Jehiel

Philippe Jehiel

University College London - Department of Economics; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn

Independent

Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

Keywords: Auction, mixed bundling, revenue maximization

JEL Classification: D4, D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Jehiel, Philippe and Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz and Moldovanu, Benny, Mixed Bundling Auctions (March 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5566, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=912466

Philippe Jehiel (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4458 2873 (Phone)
+33 1 4458 2880 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn

Independent ( email )

Sonnenbichlweg 9
85748 Garching
Germany

Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II ( email )

Lennestrasse 37
53113 Bonn
Germany
+49 228 736395 (Phone)
+49 228 737940 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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