Hedge Markets for Executives and Corporate Agency

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/9

37 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2006

See all articles by Saltuk Ozerturk

Saltuk Ozerturk

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2006


This paper analyzes the implications of executive hedge markets for firm value maximization in an optimal contracting framework. The main results are as follows: without any hedging ability, the manager underinvests in risk at the firm level to diversify his own compensation risk. If the manager can trade a security correlated with firm specific risk, the underinvestment in risk is reduced, optimal managerial share ownership and equilibrium effort increase. If the manager can hedge by simulating the sale of his shares, however, he can completely undo any incentive scheme. The model predicts that a higher degree of financial market development implies higher managerial share ownership and more efficient risk taking at the firm level.

Keywords: Managerial Hedge Markets, Inefficient Risk Reduction,Effort Provision, Optimal Managerial Share Ownership, Security Innovation

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Ozerturk, Saltuk, Hedge Markets for Executives and Corporate Agency (February 2006). CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/9, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=912694 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.912694

Saltuk Ozerturk (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics ( email )

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