Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games
20 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2006
Date Written: March 2006
Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions in finite-horizon multi-stage games for the value function of each player, associated to extremal Markov perfect equilibria, to display strategic complementarities and for the contemporaneous equilibrium to be increasing in the state variables.
Keywords: Markov game, supermodularity, two-stage game, adjustment costs, learning curve
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Xavier Vives (Contact Author)
University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )
Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
HOME PAGE: http://wwwapp.iese.edu/faculty/facultyDetail.asp?lang=en&prof=xv
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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