Trust, Power (A)Symmetry and Misrepresentation in Negotiation

Abstract

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that deception was lower when the other party was perceived as reliable, predictable or as having shared goals. Deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent. Power balance did not affect the use of deception. However, in power asymmetric dyads high trust (predictability, benevolence) decreased the use of deception whereas the same attributes triggered increases in the use of deception when power was symmetrically distributed. High predictability increased passive deception in symmetric, low power dyads whereas high benevolence increased active deception in symmetric, high power dyads. These findings are consistent with the view that low power is associated with inhibition and high power is associated with activation.