Trust, Power (A)Symmetry and Misrepresentation in Negotiation

30 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2006

See all articles by Mara Olekalns

Mara Olekalns

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Business School

Philip Smith

University of Melbourne - Department of Psychology

Abstract

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that deception was lower when the other party was perceived as reliable, predictable or as having shared goals. Deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent. Power balance did not affect the use of deception. However, in power asymmetric dyads high trust (predictability, benevolence) decreased the use of deception whereas the same attributes triggered increases in the use of deception when power was symmetrically distributed. High predictability increased passive deception in symmetric, low power dyads whereas high benevolence increased active deception in symmetric, high power dyads. These findings are consistent with the view that low power is associated with inhibition and high power is associated with activation.

Suggested Citation

Olekalns, Mara and Smith, Philip L., Trust, Power (A)Symmetry and Misrepresentation in Negotiation. IACM 2006 Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=913727 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.913727

Mara Olekalns (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8146 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8133 (Fax)

Philip L. Smith

University of Melbourne - Department of Psychology ( email )

School of Behavioural Science
Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 6343 (Phone)

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