Determinants of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention: Evidence from the Department of the Treasury

39 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2006

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

New York University - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service; Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics

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Abstract

This study employs a novel statistical strategy to examine the determinants of turnover intention in government service. To appropriately measure a main determinant of turnover intention - functional preferences - I estimate an ordinal item response model using data from the Federal Human Capital Survey. The sample is selected to facilitate an important comparison: the Internal Revenue Service has undergone significant performance-based pay reforms for supervisors, but not for non-supervisors, while the and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, also a subunit of the U.S. Treasury, has not. Inferential models of turnover intention reveal among other things that functional and friendship solidary preferences are important determinants of turnover intention, but increased accountability is associated with greater turnover among subordinates. IRS supervisors, who face paybanding, are significantly less likely to consider leaving than their counterparts in the OCC, who do not face such incentives.

Keywords: turnover intention, item response theory, bureaucratic behavior, job involvement, intrinsic motivation

JEL Classification: D73

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M., Determinants of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention: Evidence from the Department of the Treasury. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=913771

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

New York University - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service ( email )

The Puck Building
295 Lafayette Street, Second Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

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