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The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Corporate Investment Performance in Turkey

15 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2006  

Hakan Orbay

Sabanci University

B. Burcin Yurtoglu

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Abstract

In spite of the fact that most research has concentrated on the typical agency problem between managers and dispersed shareholders, in many countries large shareholders are much more frequently observed than firms with dispersed ownership structures. While large shareholders are perceived as a potential solution to the typical agency problem between managers and dispersed shareholders, less research has been done on the costs of large shareholders. One important issue in this literature is that deviations of cash flow rights from voting rights often result in substantial value discounts. In this paper we test for the impact of such deviations on corporate investment performance in Turkey. To measure corporate investment performance we estimate returns on investment relative to company costs of capital, a methodology that overcomes the endogeneity problem, which is known to contaminate results in the empirical corporate governance literature. Consistent with existing studies, we find that the average Turkish listed company has a return on investment which is less than its cost of capital. We also report significantly better investment performance for companies that do not deviate from one share - one vote by using pyramidal ownership structures, dual-class shares and other devices that enhance the control power of large shareholders beyond their cash flow rights. We also find that business group membership improves the investment performance and relative market valuation of companies.

Suggested Citation

Orbay, Hakan and Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Corporate Investment Performance in Turkey. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 349-363, July 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00511.x

Hakan Orbay

Sabanci University ( email )

Istanbul, Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla
Turkey
+90 216 483 9664 (Phone)
+90 216 483 9699 (Fax)

B. Burcin Yurtoglu (Contact Author)

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Chair of Corporate Finance
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
+49 261 6509-721 (Phone)
+49 261 6509-729 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.whu.edu/forschung/fakultaet/finance-group/corporate-finance/

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