Traffic Fatalities and Public Sector Corruption

18 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2006

See all articles by Nejat Anbarci

Nejat Anbarci

Durham University, Department of Economics and Finance; Durham University, Department of Economics and Finance

Monica Escaleras

Florida Atlantic University - Department of Economics

Charles A. Register

Florida Atlantic University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Traffic accidents result in 1 million deaths annually worldwide, though the burden is disproportionately felt in poorer countries. Typically, fatality rates from disease and accidents fall as countries develop. Traffic deaths, however, regularly increase with income, at least up to a threshold level, before declining. While we confirm this by analyzing 1,356 country-year observations between 1982 and 2000, our purpose is to consider the role played by public sector corruption in determining traffic fatalities. We find that such corruption, independent of income, plays a significant role in the epidemics of traffic fatalities that are common in relatively poor countries.

Suggested Citation

Anbarci, Nejat and Escaleras, Monica and Register, Charles A., Traffic Fatalities and Public Sector Corruption. Kyklos, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 327-344, August 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2006.00335.x

Nejat Anbarci (Contact Author)

Durham University, Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Old Elvet
Mill Hill Lane
Durham, Durham DH1 3HP
United Kingdom

Durham University, Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Old Elvet
Mill Hill Lane
Durham, Durham DH1 3HP
United Kingdom

Monica Escaleras

Florida Atlantic University - Department of Economics ( email )

5353 Parkside Dr
Jupiter, FL 33458
United States

Charles A. Register

Florida Atlantic University - Department of Economics ( email )

5353 Parkside Dr
Jupiter, FL 33458
United States
561-297-3000 Ext 73222 (Phone)

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