Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: The Werden-Froeb-Index
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. LVI, No. 4, pp. 778-808, 2008
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-10
35 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2006 Last revised: 21 Dec 2008
Abstract
In both US and EU merger control, merger-specific efficiencies are recognized as a possible defense for horizontal mergers that raise competition concerns. We introduce the Werden-Froeb-index (WFI) to assist in evaluating these efficiencies. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre-merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well-defined, objective and robust, and has relatively low information requirements. We propose to use the index as a natural complement to concentration measures (such as the Hirschmann-Herfindahl-index) in the assessment of horizontal mergers.
Keywords: Merger control, efficiency defense, index, HHI
JEL Classification: L100, L400, C430
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
By Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb
-
Post-Merger Product Repositioning
By Amit Kumar Gandhi, Luke M. Froeb, ...
-
Pass-Through Rates and the Price Effects of Mergers
By Luke M. Froeb, Steven Tschantz, ...
-
Mergers when Firms Compete by Choosing both Price and Promotion
By Luke M. Froeb, Steven Tenn, ...
-
Calibrated Economic Models Add Focus, Accuracy, and Persuasiveness to Merger Analysis
By Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb
-
Merger Simulation with Brand-Level Margin: Extending Pcaids with Nests
-
Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers
By Luke M. Froeb, Steven Tschantz, ...
-
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement
By Robert H. Lande and Alan A. Fisher