About Legislative Delegations and the Argentine Constitution: The Case for a Dualist Understanding to Tell Apart "Emergency" from "Administrative" Delegations (Reglamentos delegados de administración y reglamentos delegados de emergencia)
84 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2006
Date Written: July 2006
Legislative delegation is a tricky, inherently complex legal issue. Courts have dealt with it through a mix of self restraint and euphemistic dicta that can be hardly understood from a pure normative standpoint. This essay aims to look for a comprehensive understanding of the rise, sidestepping and fall of the nondelegation principle, combining the comparative perspective - with focus on the American constitutional practices and the lines settled by U.S. Supreme Court from cases like Hampton to Chevron - with the correlative local story as told on the argentine rulings that have shaped its reception and paved the way for the eventual inclusion in the constitutional reform of 1994.
According to the dualist theory we will outline here, it should be sketched a fundamental distinction between the more restrictive emergency delegations and the mere administrative delegations. We will try to set up such an analysis of legislative delegations as were arranged in the Argentine Constitution, article 76, in order to ascertain its theoretical as well as its political consequences - seeking to identify a set of standards and criteria that can be handled ssuccessfully and objectively by the courts for the judicial control of delegated regulations.
Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.
Keywords: nondelegation, Chevron, administrative law, constitutional law, delegación legislativa, derecho constitucional, derecho administrativo, argentina
JEL Classification: K20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation