Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetics
Posted: 20 Jul 2006
There are 2 versions of this paper
Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetics
Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetics
Date Written: December 7, 2006
Abstract
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of punishment, it is always efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: more repressive policies lead to less arrests while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes.
Keywords: deterrence, avoidance activities, enforcement of law
JEL Classification: D81, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation