Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetics

Posted: 20 Jul 2006

See all articles by Eric Langlais

Eric Langlais

EconomiX, CNRS & University of Paris Ouest

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 7, 2006

Abstract

This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of punishment, it is always efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: more repressive policies lead to less arrests while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes.

Keywords: deterrence, avoidance activities, enforcement of law

JEL Classification: D81, K42

Suggested Citation

Langlais, Eric, Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetics (December 7, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=917777

Eric Langlais (Contact Author)

EconomiX, CNRS & University of Paris Ouest ( email )

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre, 92200
France

HOME PAGE: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/fr/membres/?id=889

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
653
PlumX Metrics