Businessman Candidates

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 718-736, July 2010

28 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2006 Last revised: 24 Jun 2010

See all articles by Scott Gehlbach

Scott Gehlbach

University of Chicago

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 24, 2010

Abstract

Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that "businessman candidacy'' and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.

Keywords: businessman candidates, political selection, immature democracies, special interest politics, political connections

JEL Classification: D21, H11, O17

Suggested Citation

Gehlbach, Scott and Sonin, Konstantin and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Businessman Candidates (June 24, 2010). American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 718-736, July 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=917778

Scott Gehlbach

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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