E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications Commission

30 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2006

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Date Written: May 15, 2006

Abstract

This paper examines the theoretical promise of e-rulemaking with an examination of data about all filings at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from 1999 to 2004. The paper first reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on e-rulemaking. It then analyzes a dataset of all filings at the FCC using descriptive statistics and regression analysis to determine what drives e-filings and whether the theoretical promise of e-rulemaking is being realized six years into the experiment. The paper finds that though there has indeed been a long-term trend away from paper filings and toward electronic filings, citizen participation seems not to have increased from earlier time periods. Rather, e-filing has become a marginal change to the rulemaking process and merely another avenue by which interested parties file comments.

Keywords: E-Rulemaking, telecommunications, administrative law

JEL Classification: K23, L63

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M., E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications Commission (May 15, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=918621 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.918621

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

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