Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-48

22 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2006

See all articles by Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER

Sigrid Suetens

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics; Tilburg University

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominance-solvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes.

Keywords: experiments, cooperation, strategic substitutes and complements, externalities

JEL Classification: C7, C9, L1

Suggested Citation

Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M. and Suetens, Sigrid, Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes (March 2006). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-48, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=919720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.919720

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8204 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Sigrid Suetens (Contact Author)

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, B-2000
Belgium
+32 3 220 40 38 (Phone)

Tilburg University

Postbus 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

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