Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-48

22 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2006

See all articles by Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER

Sigrid Suetens

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics; Tilburg University

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominance-solvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes.

Keywords: experiments, cooperation, strategic substitutes and complements, externalities

JEL Classification: C7, C9, L1

Suggested Citation

Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M. and Suetens, Sigrid, Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes (March 2006). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-48. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=919720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.919720

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8204 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Sigrid Suetens (Contact Author)

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, B-2000
Belgium
+32 3 220 40 38 (Phone)

Tilburg University

Postbus 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
95
Abstract Views
681
rank
274,288
PlumX Metrics