The Moderating Influence of Firm Market Power on the Transaction Cost Economics Model: An Empirical Test in a Forward Channel Integration Context

44 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2006

See all articles by Tasadduq A. Shervani

Tasadduq A. Shervani

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Marketing Department

Gary Frazier

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Goutam Challagalla

Georgia Institute of Technology; Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2006

Abstract

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in non-integrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product-markets in the U.S. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions.

Keywords: TCE, Firm Market Power, Channel Integration

JEL Classification: M21, L63

Suggested Citation

Shervani, Tasadduq A. and Frazier, Gary and Challagalla, Goutam, The Moderating Influence of Firm Market Power on the Transaction Cost Economics Model: An Empirical Test in a Forward Channel Integration Context (July 2006). Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. MKT 04-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=920080 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.920080

Tasadduq A. Shervani (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Marketing Department ( email )

United States

Gary Frazier

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Goutam Challagalla

Georgia Institute of Technology ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30332
United States

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

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