The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements

28 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2006

See all articles by Eric Brousseau

Eric Brousseau

Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics

Regis Coeurderoy

Catholic University of Louvain

Camille Chaserant

Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre, La Défense - EconomiX

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

This paper provides new evidence on the contractual governance of technology licensing agreements. Based upon an international sample of licensing contracts, we explore how the contractual design deals with specific contractual hazards. In particular, we comparatively assess the influences of transaction attributes, institutional frameworks and strategic considerations on licensing design. Empirical results highlight that contractual clauses of governance are crafted independently of each other. This leads to a discussion about complementarities among contractual components, which is frequently assumed in theory. Furthermore, our results are certainly amongst the first to provide econometric evidence on the pervasive influence of private institutions in technology trade.

Keywords: Technology Licensing Agreements, Patents, Market for Technologies, Transaction Costs, Governance Mechanism

JEL Classification: D23, K12, L14, L22, 034

Suggested Citation

Brousseau, Eric and Coeurderoy, Regis and Chaserant, Camille, The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements (June 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=920226 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.920226

Eric Brousseau (Contact Author)

Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics ( email )

Nanterre Cedex, 92001
France
+33140975922 (Phone)
+33140975907 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/

Regis Coeurderoy

Catholic University of Louvain ( email )

Place Montesquieu, 3
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

Camille Chaserant

Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre, La Défense - EconomiX ( email )

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre cedex, Nanterre Cedex 92000
France

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