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Cartel Fines in Europe - Law, Practice and Deterrence

30 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2006  

Cento Veljanovski

Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs

Abstract

This paper examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price-fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals against many of these, the paper looks at how fines are calculated in practice, and whether they reflect consumers' losses and are likely to deter price-fixing. It also examines the impact of the amended 2006 penalty guidelines.

Keywords: Price-fixing, cartel, fines, optimal deterrence, leniency

JEL Classification: L4

Suggested Citation

Veljanovski, Cento, Cartel Fines in Europe - Law, Practice and Deterrence. World Competition, Vol. 29, March 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=920786

Cento Veljanovski (Contact Author)

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