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Cartel Fines in Europe - Law, Practice and Deterrence

Cento Veljanovski

Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs

World Competition, Vol. 29, March 2007

This paper examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price-fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals against many of these, the paper looks at how fines are calculated in practice, and whether they reflect consumers' losses and are likely to deter price-fixing. It also examines the impact of the amended 2006 penalty guidelines.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Price-fixing, cartel, fines, optimal deterrence, leniency

JEL Classification: L4

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Date posted: August 1, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Veljanovski, Cento, Cartel Fines in Europe - Law, Practice and Deterrence. World Competition, Vol. 29, March 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=920786

Contact Information

Cento Veljanovski (Contact Author)
Case Associates ( email )
1 Heddon Street
London, W1B 4BD
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 73764418 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.casecon.com
Institute of Economic Affairs
2 Lord North Street, Westminster
London, SW1P 3LB
United Kingdom
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