On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout

44 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2006

See all articles by Esteban F. Klor

Esteban F. Klor

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Eyal Winter

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information significantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. This behaviour contradicts the qualitative predictions of the unique quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium of the theoretical model. We show that the heterogeneous effect of information on the participation of subjects in different teams is driven by the subjects' (incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their inflated probability assessment. Empirical evidence on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005 is consistent with our main experimental result. Namely, we observe that the difference in the actual vote tally between the party leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls only in closely divided electorates. We provide a behavioural model that explains the main findings of our experimental and empirical analyses.

Keywords: Voter turnout, public opinion polls, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D72, H41

Suggested Citation

Klor, Esteban F. and Winter, Eyal, On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout (May 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5669, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=921100

Esteban F. Klor (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel
+972 2 588 3143 (Phone)
+972 2 581 6071 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://economics.huji.ac.il/facultye/klor/klor.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Eyal Winter

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel
+972 2 658 4154 (Phone)
+972 2 651 3681 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/%7Emseyal/

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