Foreign Trading Screens in the United States

Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 54-76, 2006

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 549

23 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2006 Last revised: 24 Apr 2015

See all articles by Howell E. Jackson

Howell E. Jackson

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andreas Martin Fleckner

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Law; Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law

Mark Gurevich

Ropes & Gray

Abstract

Remote trading screens allow investors to trade on an exchange without being physically present at the exchange. Europeans have repeatedly urged the United States to facilitate the placement of such screens from European exchanges on American soil. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, however, has objected to the placement of those terminals unless the foreign marketplace registers as a national securities exchange under U.S. law. This article argues that technological advances in the securities industry have largely mooted the controversy. Current requirements neither protect U.S. investors as much as the SEC claims nor inhibit competition as much as the European side asserts.

Keywords: stock exchange, trading screen, securities trading, internationalization, state intervention, protectionism, legal harmonization

JEL Classification: F30, F50, G15, G18, G24, G28, K22

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Howell Edmunds and Fleckner, Andreas Martin and Gurevich, Mark, Foreign Trading Screens in the United States. Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 54-76, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 549, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=921435

Howell Edmunds Jackson (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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617-495-5466 (Phone)
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Andreas Martin Fleckner

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Law ( email )

Unter den Linden 6
Berlin, D-10099
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Mark Gurevich

Ropes & Gray

One International Place
Boston, MA 02110
United States

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