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Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments

24 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2006  

Hideki Mizukami

College of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University

Takuma Wakayama

Ryukoku University

Date Written: July 27, 2006

Abstract

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.

Keywords: Augmented Revelation Mechanism, Strategy-Proofness, Balancedness, Quasi-Strong-Non-Bossiness, The Revelation Principle

JEL Classification: D51, C72, D71, D78

Suggested Citation

Mizukami, Hideki and Wakayama, Takuma, Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments (July 27, 2006). ISER Discussion Paper No. 669. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=921517 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.921517

Hideki Mizukami (Contact Author)

College of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University ( email )

4-4-25 Shibuya, Shibuya-Ku
Tokyo, 150-8366
Japan

Takuma Wakayama

Ryukoku University ( email )

67 Tsukamoto-cho,Fukakusa,
Fushimi-ku,
Kyoto, Kyoto 612-8577
Japan

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