Information Disclosure and Regulatory Compliance: Economic Issues and Research Directions

Abstract

The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) introduced significant changes to financial practice and corporate governance regulation, including stringent new rules designed to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. Briefly speaking, it requires management to submit a report containing an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure, a description of material weaknesses in such internal controls and of any material noncompliance. Such mandatory regulations can have some broader ramifications on firm profitability, market structure and social welfare, many of which were unintended when policy makers first formulated this Act. Moreover, the tight coupling between compliance activities, information disclosure and IT investments can have implications for IT governance because of its potential to change relationships between technology investments and business. This article aims to provide insights into the trade-offs involved for firms in disclosure of such information, and gives an overview of some research questions that are yet to be addressed.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley, Information Disclosure, Information Security, Government Regulation, Firm Performance, Market Structure, Social Welfare

JEL Classification: D40, D60, G34, G38, K22, L10, M41