Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/41

16 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2006

See all articles by Francoise Forges

Francoise Forges

Université Paris Dauphine - CEREMADE; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

A mistake in "Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information" motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium, Bayesian rationality, games with incomplete information

Suggested Citation

Forges, Francoise, Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited (May 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=921829 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.921829

Francoise Forges (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine - CEREMADE ( email )

Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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