Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design

74 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank

Edward J. Kane

Boston College - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 1, 2006

Abstract

The authors seek to identify factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a new dataset on 170 countries covering the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, they focus on how outside influences, economic development, crisis pressures, and political institutions affect deposit insurance adoption and design. Controlling for the influence of economic characteristics and events such as macroeconomic shocks, occurrence and severity of crises, and institutional development, they find that pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory frameworks and power-sharing political institutions dispose a country toward adopting design features that inadequately control risk-shifting.

Keywords: Banks & Banking Reform, Economic Theory & Research, Financial Intermediation, Insurance & Risk Mitigation, Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring

Suggested Citation

Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Kane, Edward J. and Laeven, Luc A., Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design (February 1, 2006). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3849, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=922975

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Edward J. Kane

Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )

Fulton Hall
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
520-299-5066 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Luc A. Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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