Competition and Performance in the Hungarian Second Pillar

80 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Gregorio Impavido

Gregorio Impavido

International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank

Roberto de Rezende Rocha

World Bank - Middle East & North Africa Region; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 1, 2006

Abstract

The performance of the Hungarian second pillar since inception has been mixed. This is partly due to a less than satisfactory support for the 1997 pension reform, conservative fund portfolio distributions, the hybrid nature of the mandatory pension fund system, the segmented nature of the market in terms of costs, and a less than aggressive commitment on the part of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority to a low-cost, transparent, and competitive equilibrium. In the accumulation phase, the authorities would need to further promote transparency and comparability of information on costs and investment performance, facilitate migration to lower cost funds, and more generally promote competition. The regulatory framework of the payout phase needs to be overhauled before the first cohort of workers retires.

Keywords: Investment and Investment Climate, Economic Theory & Research, Economic Stabilization, Financial Intermediation, Settlement of Investment Disputes

Suggested Citation

Impavido, Gregorio and Rocha, Roberto de Rezende, Competition and Performance in the Hungarian Second Pillar (April 1, 2006). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3876. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=923226

Gregorio Impavido (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.imf.org

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Roberto de Rezende Rocha

World Bank - Middle East & North Africa Region ( email )

1818 H Street N.W
Washington, DC 20433
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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