Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory

49 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2006

See all articles by Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P. Kostritsky

Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Abstract

This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for deterrence, should not apply the no-effect rule of illegal contracts uniformly and why they should vary the type of relief according to the factual setting. It posits that a graduated relief structure will maximize efficient deterrence. An efficient deterrence scheme will preserve limited personal, judicial and societal resources without burdening legitimate transactions.

Keywords: Public Policy, Illegality, No Effect, Contracts, No-effect Rule, Illegal Contracts, Graduated Relief Structure, Deterrence

JEL Classification: K12, K49

Suggested Citation

Kostritsky, Juliet P., Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory. Iowa Law Review, Vol. 74, p. 115, 1988. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=923577

Juliet P. Kostritsky (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University School of Law ( email )

11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106-7148
United States
216-368-3982 (Phone)

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