Credit Assignment and Federal Encroachment

39 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2006

See all articles by Jenna Bednar

Jenna Bednar

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; Santa Fe Institute

Abstract

Opportunistic encroachment by the national government on state policy domains erodes the robustness of federal unions. Theories of electoral and political safeguards of federalism suggest that the political process protects federalism's boundaries. This article develops a theory distinguishing risk-seeking and risk-avoiding political behavior and applies its insights to the debate about the sufficiency of the political process to police federalism. Under average conditions, the political process deters encroachment, but under more extreme conditions it fails: elected officials set policy according to the risk associated with their electoral retention rather than the policy's expected return to the voters or the health of the federation; this manipulation of the risk environment may lead a central government to encroach upon a state's domain opportunistically. The federal problem of credit assignment exposes a weakness in the political safeguards theory to protect federalism's boundaries: electoral mechanisms both encourage and discourage encroachment. Due to this fallibility in the political process, judicial intervention in federalism disputes may be justified.

Keywords: federalism, political safeguards, judicial intervention

JEL Classification: D81, H77

Suggested Citation

Bednar, Jenna, Credit Assignment and Federal Encroachment. Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 15, January 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=924395

Jenna Bednar (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

735 South State Street, Weill Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

Santa Fe Institute ( email )

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
93
Abstract Views
882
Rank
552,170
PlumX Metrics