The Political Economy of Xenophobia and Distribution: The Case of Denmark

27 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2006

See all articles by John E. Roemer

John E. Roemer

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Karine Van der Straeten

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie

Abstract

For the first time in some years, a conservative government came to power in Denmark in 2001, due primarily to the citizenry's disaffection with social-democratic policies on immigration. We represent political competition in Denmark as taking place over two issues - the size of the public sector and immigration - and model political equilibrium using the party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) concept, which generates equilibria on multi-dimensional policy spaces where parties form endogenously. By fitting the model to Danish data, we argue that citizen xenophobia may be expected to decrease the size of the Danish public sector by an amount between 12% and 36% of one standard deviation of the probability distribution of citizens' ideal points of the size of the public sector.

Suggested Citation

Roemer, John E. and Van der Straeten, Karine, The Political Economy of Xenophobia and Distribution: The Case of Denmark. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 251-277, July 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=924488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00450.x

John E. Roemer (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5249 (Phone)
203-432-6196 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jer39/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Karine Van der Straeten

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )

1 rue Descartes
Paris, 75005
France

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