Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?

32 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2006

See all articles by Paola Conconi

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: July 2006

Abstract

We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient polices may be most easily sustained when countries are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger are the international spillovers of domestic policies.

Keywords: International agreements, domestic policy commitment

JEL Classification: F02, F10

Suggested Citation

Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo, Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (July 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5762. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=925252

Paola Conconi (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
44 24 7652 8416 (Phone)
44 24 7652 3032 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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