Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France

28 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2006

See all articles by Eshien Chong

Eshien Chong

University of Paris XI - ADIS GRJM

Freddy Huet

University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - ATOM Center

Stéphane Saussier

IAE - University of Paris I Sorbonne

Faye Steiner

University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CES Team

Abstract

We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average.

Keywords: Contractual Choices, Public-Private Partnerships, Public Services, Transaction Costs, Water supply

JEL Classification: H0, H7, K00, L33

Suggested Citation

Chong, Eshien and Huet, Freddy and Saussier, Stephane and Steiner, Faye, Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France. Review of Industrial Organization, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=925344

Eshien Chong

University of Paris XI - ADIS GRJM ( email )

54 Boulevard Desgranges
Sceaux Cedex, 92331
France

Freddy Huet

University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - ATOM Center ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris cedex 05, 75231
France

Stephane Saussier (Contact Author)

IAE - University of Paris I Sorbonne ( email )

21, Rue Broca
Paris, 75005
France

Faye Steiner

University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CES Team ( email )

12, place du Panthéon
Paris, IL
France
+33 (0) 1 44 07 82 69 (Phone)

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