Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making

44 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2006  

Todd C. Peppers

Roanoke College

Christopher J. Zorn

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: June 14, 2007

Abstract

For more than a half-century, legal scholars and commentators have questioned whether Supreme Court clerks wield excessive power over the operations and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet to date there have been no attempts to determine systematically if, how, and how much clerks can influence the Court's decision making. Here we begin an effort to do so, focusing first on the most central - and least susceptible to clerk influence - locus of the Court's decision making, the votes of the justices on the merits. Using original data collected on the political partisanship of 532 former law clerks, we assess whether and to what extent law clerk ideology has an independent effect on how Supreme Court justices vote on the merits of a case. Our findings indicate that, even after controlling for justices' own policy preferences, the ideological propensities of their clerks exerts an independent influence on the justices' voting behavior; we estimate the magnitude of that effect to be roughly one-third that of the ideology of the justices themselves. While this finding alone does not suggest that law clerks are inappropriately wielding influence, it suggests that, at a minimum, the justices rely heavily upon their clerks as sounding boards and advisers in deciding how to vote on the merits of cases.

Keywords: Supreme Court, clerks, judicial decision making, voting

Suggested Citation

Peppers, Todd C. and Zorn, Christopher J., Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making (June 14, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=925705 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.925705

Todd C. Peppers (Contact Author)

Roanoke College ( email )

Salem, VA 24153
United States

Christopher J. Zorn

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
580
Rank
36,504
Abstract Views
4,001