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Protecting Minority Shareholders: Listed versus Unlisted Firms

50 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2006 Last revised: 23 Dec 2008

Claudio F. Loderer

University of Berne - Institute for Financial Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Urs Waelchli

Rochester-Bern Executive Programs; University of Rochester - Simon Business School

Date Written: November 17, 2008

Abstract

Listed firms have an incentive to render themselves attractive to investors at large. This paper examines whether listed and unlisted firms differ in their care for minority shareholders and finds supporting evidence. We examine control structure, disclosure, board architecture and processes, and director compensation. The corporate governance package in listed firms differs from that in unlisted firms in terms of levels and mix of the different provisions. The data also suggest that listed firms perform better.

Keywords: Minority protection, unlisted firms, corporate governance, board of directors, disclosure

JEL Classification: G30, K00

Suggested Citation

Loderer, Claudio F. and Waelchli, Urs, Protecting Minority Shareholders: Listed versus Unlisted Firms (November 17, 2008). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 133/2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=926048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.926048

Claudio F. Loderer (Contact Author)

University of Berne - Institute for Financial Management ( email )

Engehaldenstrasse 4
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland
+41 31 631 37 75 (Phone)
+41 31 631 84 21 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Urs Waelchli

Rochester-Bern Executive Programs ( email )

Engehaldenstrasse 4
Bern, 3012
Switzerland

University of Rochester - Simon Business School ( email )

Rochester, NY 14627
United States

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