51 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2006
Date Written: August 2006
We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Currie, Janet and MacLeod, W. Bentley, First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes (August 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12478. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=926057