Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information

25 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2006

See all articles by Patrick W. Schmitz

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2006

Abstract

Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can sell an object to one of n potential buyers. Each buyer either has hard information about his valuation (i.e., evidence that cannot be forged) or is ignorant. The optimal mechanism is characterized. It turns out that more ignorance can increase the expected total surplus. Even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric, the object may be sold to a buyer who does not have the largest willingness-to-pay. Nevertheless, an additional buyer increases the expected total surplus in the symmetric case, whereas more competition can be harmful if there are ex ante asymmetries.

Keywords: mechanism design, hard information

JEL Classification: D42, D82

Suggested Citation

Schmitz, Patrick W., Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information (July 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5747. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=926144

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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